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ABSTRACT

In this research I first examine how Americans’ perceptions of what it takes to get ahead
are influenced by their income and then compare those perceptions to measured levels of
intergenerational socio-economic mobility. By better understanding these relationships I hope
to gain insight into the paths people see to upward mobility, how this varies by income, and to
what extent this belief is reflected in past mobility measurements. Additionally, I compare
perceptions of what it takes to get ahead with responses regarding attitudes towards public
assistance. The results of such a comparison could have important implications for public policy.
The results reveal that there is a significant correlation between income and views of
what it takes to get ahead with those at higher income levels perceiving greater levels of
opportunity for mobility. Perceptions of opportunity for mobility appear high across all incomes
relative to previous measurements of mobility. However, the low income group perceived less
opportunity than the middle income group which reflects the pattern of measured levels of
mobility. Also, views on the importance of educated parents and working hard are significant
predictors of attitudes on public assistance. Belief in the less meritocratic indicators was
associated with support for public assistance while belief in the more meritocratic indicators was
associated with opposition.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

The promise of upward mobility, of getting ahead, has been an important part of the
image of the United States since its inception, but is that promise being kept? Such opportunity
is the central tenet of the American Dream, but has the dream faded? The idea that rags to riches
is possible, that great success is attainable for those sufficiently determined, runs deep enough
in the public consciousness that it is a common theme in popular fiction as well as political
rhetoric (Page and Jacobs 2009; Kraus and Tan 2015). The questions are about who holds these
beliefs, who experiences this type of mobility, and how those beliefs impact public policy views.
Using perception data collected as part of the 2010 General Social Survey (Smith et al.
2010) for the 2009 International Social Survey Program’s Social Inequality Module (ISSP 2012), I
examine how Americans’ perceptions of what it takes to get ahead are influenced by their
income. To put these perceptions into proper perspective, I then compare those perceptions to
measured levels of intergenerational mobility for different income groups. Finally, I compare the
responses on perceptions of what it takes to get ahead with responses regarding attitudes
towards spending on public assistance. The intent of this final step is to examine the extent to
which Americans who see the United States as more meritocratic with greater possibility for
socio-economic mobility (SEM) through individual effort and accomplishment are less likely to
1

support public assistance. Previous research has found related links (Guetzkow 2010; Katz 2013),
but the goal of this present research is to add to the existing body of literature though analysis
of this highly appropriate and robust data set not previously used in this way. Also less common
in the existing literature is investigation of how perceptions of economic mobility may be linked
to the typical intergenerational mobility patterns of individuals at different levels of income.
The goal of this research is to answer the following questions.

RQ1A: Is there a relationship between income and perception of opportunity for
socio-economic mobility?
RQ1B: How do perceptions of opportunity for socio-economic mobility compare
to measured levels of mobility at each level of income?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between perceptions of socio-economic mobility and
attitudes towards public assistance?
RQ1A will allow me to determine if Americans’ relatively high average perceptions of mobility
could be masking lower perceived levels in lower income groups as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest
and Griffith (2001) argues. RQ1B gives context to RQ1A. Only by comparing perceptions to the
levels of mobility found in previous research does it become possible to understand if the
perceptions are out of sync with levels of mobility in the way that Jäntti et al. (2006) and Griffith
(2001) state. The features of these relationships have important implications for sociology,
psychology, economics, and political science. One of the most immediate practical applications
for this information, however, is related specifically to public policy. With RQ2 I will begin to
explore this. Individuals’ beliefs or perceptions drive their actions; perception is reality. Jäntti et
al. (2006) suggest that an over perception of mobility could be responsible for a lack of political
pressure for policies that would facilitate mobility. To determine if this is possible I will look for
2

a relationship between perceptions of what it takes to get ahead and attitudes towards
spending on public assistance. If those who strongly believe mobility is possible through
individual effort are more likely to oppose spending on public assistance, then what Jäntti et al.
(2006) suggest is possible.
Limited socio-economic mobility is positively correlated with higher rates of inequality
(Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Solon 2004; Corak 2006; d’Addio 2007; Andrews and Leigh 2009;
Causa and Johnson 2010; Corak 2013; cf. Torche 2015), yet Americans are more willing to accept
high levels of inequality because of the promise of mobility (Shepelak 1987; Fields and Ok 1999;
Benabou and Ok 2001; Bartels 2005; Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009;
Arawatari and Ono 2013; Corak 2013; Obama 2013; Stiglitz 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015).
Both represent significant social problems that have deleterious effects not just on those with
lower socio-economic status (SES), but on society at large (Persson and Tabellini 1994: Alesina,
Di Tella, and MacCulloch 2004; Collins and Yeskel 2005; Stiglitz 2012; Stiglitz 2015). With higher
levels of inequality economic growth is hindered (Persson and Tabellini 1994). Highly unequal
societies are inefficient as well as economically unstable and unsustainable (Stiglitz 2012). One
of the reasons for this inefficiency and stifled growth according to Joseph Stiglitz (2012) is that
“Whenever we diminish equality of opportunity, we are not using one of our most valuable
assets—our people—in the most productive way possible” (P. 117). Another aspect of the human
cost is that with higher levels of inequality, people are less likely to report that they are happy
even when controlling for income (Alesina et al. 2004). While some aspects of the relationship
between mobility and inequality are complex, their negative correlation to each other and
consequences for a society are well established.
3

While socio-economic mobility, or the opportunity for it, has been researched
extensively, there are questions raised by such research that remain unanswered about how
people perceive mobility, what shapes those perceptions, and how those perceptions influence
public policy opinions. There are a few strongly related, but still distinct areas of research
importance here. First is differentiation between types of mobility, followed by issues in
measurement of mobility, and then established levels of mobility in the United States. Next is
inequality as it relates to mobility and then an international comparison of perceived and
measured mobility before a more detailed discussion of American perceptions of mobility and
opportunity for mobility. This is followed by concepts more directly related to public assistance
including the American Dream and social construction of deservingness. These issues are
important worldwide, but the American Dream, the idea that anyone has the opportunity for
advancement through hard work, is engrained in the American psyche in a way that adds an
important cultural dimension to such research on the United States.

4

CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Socio-economic Mobility
Types of Socio-economic Mobility
Mobility as used here should be understood as upward or downward movement through
socio-economic strata. Unless otherwise stated, the focus is on intergenerational mobility, the
difference in SES attainment of parents compared to their children. This should not be confused
with intragenerational mobility, the change in SES that people may experience within their adult
lives. The mobility discussed in this research also refers to relative mobility, a change in SES such
as moving from the working class to the middle class. This is different from absolute mobility
which results from widespread economic upturns or downturns but not any change in relative
position on the income ladder (Isaacs et al. 2008; Noah 2012). This issue is complicated by
changes in income inequality that can allow widespread economic fluctuations to impact those
at different income levels in unequal ways. As an example, however, if an economic boom allows
the children of parents in the 60% income percentile to earn more than their parents, for
example, they experience absolute upward mobility but not relative mobility if they remain near
the 60th income percentile because average incomes have risen across the board. Another
important distinction to make with regard to mobility depends on whether the strata are defined
5

with respect to wealth or income. Though wealth may be a better indicator of SES than income,
out of necessity most mobility research is based on income or even occupation (usually as
measured by a scale of occupational prestige) due to data limitations. Wealth data may be less
available and harder to collect than income data, but it is a concern primarily when looking at
the uppermost income quintiles where it is concentrated (Piketty 2014).
The difference between opportunity for mobility and actual or experienced mobility is
also important, but somewhat more difficult to address. The two are often used interchangeably
with the levels of mobility found assumed to be indicative of the level of opportunity for mobility.
However, it should be noted that this relationship between mobility and opportunity for mobility
is not accepted by all (see Jenks and Tach 2006). One possible source of controversy is differing
definitions or understandings of equal opportunity (Roemer 2000). The relationship between
experienced mobility and opportunity for mobility will be discussed further in the Results and
Discussion section.

Measuring Mobility
Mobility, or the absence of mobility called elasticity, transmission, persistence (of
status), or stickiness is difficult to measure. Though there are noteworthy currents within this
area, different methods of research on mobility have yielded meaningfully different results
regarding both levels and trends (Fields and Ok 1999; Jantti et al. 2006; Causa and Johnson 2010;
Amiel et al 2015). Causa and Johnson (2010) note the complexity of the issue, the absence of an
objective or easy to compare benchmark, and that “no single indicator provides a complete
picture” (P. 3). The range and complexity of methodological choices in mobility research as well
6

as the sensitivity of the results to those choices (Isaacs et. al 2008) reduces the number of reliable
results (Hauser 1998) and makes comparing the results of different studies precarious. For
example, Beller and Hout (2006) as well as Lee and Solon (2009) express doubts about the
findings in the earlier work of Becker and Tomes (1986). Becker and Tomes’ (1986) found very
high levels of mobility concluding “Almost all the earnings advantages or disadvantages of
ancestors are wiped out in three generations” (P. 25). This finding remained largely unopposed
until research published in 1992 by Solon suggested there was far less mobility than previously
found. The studies that followed typically found results closer to those of Solon (1992), than
those of Becker and Tomes (1986). It was suggested that this was not indicative of a change in
levels of mobility, but rather that the earlier results were the product of flawed methods (Solon
1992, 2009; Beller and Howt 2006).
The elasticity of intergenerational income has already been thoroughly researched
(Blanden 2013), but the immense difficulty and complexity of measuring such mobility has led
to inconsistencies (Fields and Ok 1999; Lee and Solon 2009) that cloud the issue. Furthermore,
there are aspects of mobility that are underrepresented in the literature. Average levels of
income persistence or elasticity for a country as well as international comparisons are so
numerous that I could not hope or dare to include all of them here. To a lesser extent studies of
mobility trends over time are also well represented. For the United States there is less research,
however, about variations in intergenerational mobility based on sex, race, income, region, and
other characteristics.
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Levels of Mobility in the United States
Though levels of mobility found vary for the reasons previously discussed, one of the
lower reliable estimates is an average of 40% mobility (elasticity 0.6) across all income groups
(Mazumder 2005) and on the high end 70% (Chetty et al 2014a, 2014b). Mazumder (2005) claims
he found highest level of elasticity, or lowest level of mobility, because he is using more recent
data than most from social security records. When he applied his methods to earlier data from
another source he got results more similar to earlier studies implying that his methods where
not the cause of the discrepancy, but rather that the more recent data revealed higher levels of
elasticity than previously existed.
Since how to measure the level of mobility is a challenging and somewhat controversial
arena, attempts to identify its trends overtime are even more so. There is a noteworthy amount
of research suggesting that levels of mobility are essentially stable (Hertz 2007; Lee and Solon
2009; Chetty et al. 2014a, 2014b) as well decreasing (Auten and Gee 2009; Bradbury 2011; Noah
2012). Understandably, there are also some who say the muddled results suggest that there is
no clear trend or that a definitive statement cannot be made due to contradictory results (Isaacs
et. al 2008; Torche 2015). It is significant that there does not appear to be any research
suggesting an overall increase.
Regarding current levels of SEM, the United States is typically found to have lower levels
than comparable countries (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Bengali and Daly 2013), but what
those levels are and the direction in which they are going is more controversial. There is a
substantial body of work suggesting that mobility has declined (Bradbury and Katz 2002;
Hungerford 2008; Bradbury 2011; Corak 2013), while others suggest an increase (U.S.
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Department of Treasury 1992a, 1992b). There are also studies that have found levels of mobility
in recent decades to be stagnant (McMurrer and Sawhill 1996; Acs and Zimmerman 2008; Auten
2009). Some of these discrepancies can be explained by differences in the period of time
examined and other methodological differences (Solon 1992, Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002). An
example of a sampling choice that could result in such difference is the limitation of the age
group included. The lower the upper limit placed on age for the sample, the higher the level of
mobility found (Carroll, Joulfaian, and Rider 2006; Auten 2009).
Though income is the demographic variable most central to this research, there are of
course many other indicators that research has shown to impact mobility. There is a focus on
fathers and sons because of the longitudinal nature of data required for mobility studies and
issues with women’s labor force participation (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). This is more
defensible in earlier work, but is becoming less so (Blanden 2013). One way to avoid the issue
altogether is to use family income (Torche 2015). As an added benefit family income where it
refers to the immediate family is preferable over individual income because it better indicator of
SES (Mazumder 2005). However, this does not eliminate the need for research comparing the
intricacies of mobility trends of sons and daughters since differences have been found (Jäntti et
al. 2006; Causa and Johnson 2010). There is also a clear race based mobility gap. In multiple
studies Americans identified as black have shown less upward mobility than those identified as
white (Hertz 2005; Isaacs et. al 2008; Currier 2012; Economic Mobility Project 2012; Mazumder
2014). There is less research on location or geography, but what has been done has found
location to be a significant factor determining levels of mobility (Chetty et al 2014c).
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Since levels of mobility vary between people of different SES, reporting the results
broken down into income quintiles, for example, gives a far different impression than an average
for all income levels (Jäntti et al. 2006). For this and other reasons to be addressed, this work
includes a focus on differences in responses based on the income of the respondent. Of the large
number of studies on mobility in the United States only a small subset of those using data from
a period ending in the last 20 years produced income specific results.
A group of economists at the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis used
tax returns from 1981 to 1995 to look at intragenerational mobility. They found that in the lowest
quintile 54% were able to move up leaving 46% remaining there (Carroll et al. 2006). They also
found that 53% of those in the highest quintile in 1981 were still there in 1995 meaning 47% fell
below (Carroll et al. 2006). Regarding extreme mobility, 4% of people from the bottom income
quintile moved to the top during this period, and 7.5% from the top fell to the bottom (Carroll et
al. 2006).
Jäntti et al. (2006) used data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth which
included people born between 1957 and 1964 and compared family income from that time to
children’s earnings in adulthood for the years 1995 and 2001. Looking only at males only, they
found that over 40% of those born into the bottom quintile stayed there (60% mobility), while
over 36% stayed in the top quintile (64% mobility). They point out an incongruity between the
levels of mobility they found and the perception of mobility in the United States in particular
among the other countries in their study. They speculate that Americans’ perceptions of SEM
may be skewed upward because of higher levels of upward mobility experienced by the middle
class. Specifically they suggest that knowledge of this mobility, either from experiencing or
10

witnessing it, might be overgeneralized to create the perception that it is more common than it
actually is among all socio-economic strata (Jäntti et al. 2006).
A report released by the Brookings Institute in 2008 used data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics collected beginning in 1968 with people ages 0-18 and followed until 2004.
Brookings produced the stickiness numbers taking the mean of family income from 1967-1971
and comparing it to the mean of the family income of the children, now adults, in five selected
years in the 1990s and 2000s (Isaacs et al. 2008). They found a stickiness rate of 42% for the
lowest income quintile meaning 58% chance of upward mobility into a higher quintile (Isaacs et
al. 2008). They characterized these as “twice as high as would be expected by chance” (Isaacs et
al. 2008:4). They described the middle income group including the second, third, and fourth
quintiles as having “roughly an equal shot at moving up or moving down and of ending up in a
different income quintile than their parents” (Isaac et al. 2008:4). For the top income quintile
they found the level of stickiness to be 39% leaving a 61% chance of downward mobility into a
lower quintile (Isaacs et al. 2008).

Income Inequality as it Relates to Mobility
The question of mobility levels and trends may remain less than settled, but there is a
general consensus that inequality is on the rise in recent decades (Morris and Western 1999;
Piketty and Saez 2003; Collins and Yeskel 2005; Gottschalk and Danziger 2005; McCall 2005;
Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Bartels 2008; Goldin and Katz 2008; Isaacs et. al 2008; Kelly and Enns
2010; Page and Jacobs 2009; Xu and Garand 2010; Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2015).
Though this has not happened without consternation, the promise of mobility looms large and
11

makes it more palatable (Shepelak 1987; Fields and Ok 1999; Benabou and Ok 2001; Bartels
2005; Isaacs et al. 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009; Arawatari and Ono 2013; Corak 2013; Obama
2013; Stiglitz 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015). This valuation is not some less-than-conscious
ideological undercurrent either; it is a feature, not a bug. In a 2013 speech President Barack
Obama put it plainly,

We've often accepted more income inequality than many other
nations for one big reason -- because we were convinced that
America is a place where even if you’re born with nothing, with a
little hard work you can improve your own situation over time and
build something better to leave your kids. As Lincoln once said,
‘WhiIe we do not propose any war upon capital, we do wish to
allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with
everybody eIse’ (2013).

This is not tacit approval, but rather open endorsement of this bargain. One problem with
accepting inequality as long as mobility remains robust is the negative correlation between the
two (Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Solon 2004; Corak 2006; d’Addio 2007; Andrews and Leigh 2009;
Causa and Johnson 2010; Corak 2013; cf. Torche 2015). The president addressed this also in the
same speech. “This is the defining challenge of our time … The combined trends of increased
inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American Dream, our way
of life, and what we stand for around the globe” (Obama 2013).
Americans’ acceptance of inequality cannot be traced to ideology alone but rather is
rooted in complex political power relations that stretch back to the founding of the nation
(Thompson 2007). Chetty et al. (2014b) suggest that trends in income and mobility have a
complex interaction. They state, “Although rank-based measures of mobility remained stable,
12

income inequality increased over time in our sample, consistent with prior work. Hence, the
consequences of the ‘birth lottery’ – the parents to whom a child is born – are larger today than
in the past” (Chetty et al. 2014b:141). Though the relationship between income and perceptions
of mobility is limited, perceptions of inequality have been more thoroughly explored. From such
research it is clear that factors like income do have an impact on perceptions of inequality
(Alesina et al. 2004; Xu and Garand 2010). This suggests a relationship between income and
perceptions of mobility or opportunity for mobility is also possible.

International Comparison
Adding another layer of complexity to the study of mobility and inequality in the United
States is the growing wealth divide and stagnation of wages (Noah 2012). As a social problem
this makes mobility research all the more important, but at the same time can make it more
challenging for studies of the U.S. and international comparisons. In international comparisons,
the United States is often measured against nations such as Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. However, some researchers have added a
caveat to the results of such work regarding income differences. If two countries have income
distributions dissimilar enough, then even if their mobility levels are similar, outcomes for
people in those countries can still be very different (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Blanden
2013; Corak, Lindquist, and Mazumder 2014). Corak et al. (2014) find that

It may be the case that moving 10 percentiles from the bottom of
the earnings distribution is significantly more meaningful in the
U.S. in terms of living standards than a comparable move in
Sweden. For example, we find that upward mobility plays a much
13

larger role in the U.S. in terms of keeping an individual out of
poverty than in Canada and Sweden (P. 19).

While international comparisons of mobility are still meaningful and important, they must be
interpreted in the context of the differing income distributions of the countries in question.
Despite such findings Americans perceive high levels of mobility or opportunity for mobility
compared to economically comparable countries (ISSP 2001; Isaacs et. al 2008; ISSP 2012). That
higher perceived level of mobility does not appear to be paralleled by higher levels of actual
mobility (Jäntti et al. 2006; d’Addio 2007; Isaacs et al. 2008; Causa and Johnson 2010; Noah 2012;
Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov et al. 2013; Corak 2013; Mazumder 2014; Kraus and Tan 2015).
It is possible that because the U.S. had higher levels of mobility than European nations from its
founding through the 19th century (Ferrie 2005, Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012) the idea still persists
even though it is no longer the case.

American Mobility Perceptions
Comparing intergenerational mobility and attitudes towards it in the United States with
that of other nations puts the peculiar trends of the U.S. into stark relief, but does not always
make the reasons for those differences clear. One possible explanation is that Americans heavily
prioritize equality of opportunity over equality of outcomes (Ladd and Bowman 1998; Benabou
and Ok 2001; Page and Jacobs 2009; Obama 2013; Stiglitz 2015). A report from the American
Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, addresses the importance of perceptions of
opportunity.

14

Equality of opportunity is a demanding social standard. It requires
that people perceive the rules of the game to be far. If they believe
that this is the case, they put up with disparities in income and
status. If people believe that the rules are being rigged to favor one
group or another, inequality could become a more important
political issue (Ladd and Bowman 1998:3).

This report recognizes the lack of political pressure to reduce income inequality and that it
hinges on a perception of fairness through equal opportunity. To explain their finding that the
poor in the U.S. do not seem overly concerned with inequality compared to those in European
nations, Alesina et al. (2004) contend, “these findings are consistent with the perception (not
necessarily the reality) that Americans have been living in a mobile society, where individual
effort can move people up and down the income ladder while Europeans believe that they live
in less mobile societies” (P. 2009). A focus on equality of opportunity and the suggestion that it
makes lived inequality more acceptable raises important questions. What does this imply about
the perceived connection between opportunity and outcomes or lived experiences? At what
point does a belief in opportunity become strained? To what extent does economic inequality
reflect levels of opportunity or lack thereof? Or, more relevant to this work, to what extent do
people attribute socio-economic mobility or lack thereof to opportunity or lack thereof?
American’s perceptions of mobility do not typically reflect average levels of mobility
experienced (Jantii et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Noah 2012; Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov
at al. 2013; Kraus and Tan 2015), but the relationship between perception and “reality” is not as
simple as everyone seeing more than there is. When this work began there did not appear to be
any published studies that investigated the influence of income on perceptions of mobility (or
opportunity for mobility) or compared those perceptions to measurements of mobility as this
15

work does. Very recently, however, two have been published that begin to fill this void.
However, they used methods substantially different from this research (Chambers, Swan, and
Heesacker 2014; Davidai and Gilovich 2014). Both used survey questions where they asked
participants to estimate the likelihood that a person born into a given income level or class would
move up or down into a different one in their lifetimes. In contrast the research reported in this
thesis uses questions about what it takes to get ahead in order to assess respondents’
perceptions of opportunity for upward mobility and how meritocratic or non-meritocratic the
system is. This does not produce numbers directly representative of perceived levels of mobility,
but rather perceived opportunity for mobility under the interpretation that perceiving the
system as meritocratic corresponds to a perception that opportunity for mobility exists whereas
perceiving the system as non-meritocratic corresponds to a perception that the opportunity for
mobility is limited or non-existent
In contrast to much previous research, Chambers et al. (2014) found that respondents
underestimated the current level of mobility. Those sampled also seemed to believe that
mobility has declined (Chambers et al. 2014) which previous studies are divided on. There was
an ideological divide in these findings, however, with both of these results being more
pronounced with politically liberal respondents (Chambers et al. 2014). Davidai and Gilovich
(2014) also found an ideological divide with political conservatives perceiving more mobility,
both up and down. However, their results showed that those with higher income also tended to
perceive more mobility. Comparing to established levels of experienced mobility, as an average
with all income groups and political persuasions they found that Americans see unrealistically
high amounts of upward mobility and while underestimating downward mobility.
16

Horatio Alger’s rags to riches stories made upward mobility seem common and
attainable (Carey 1973; Mazumder 2005; Auten 2009; Page and Jacobs 2009: Davidai and
Gilovich 2014; Stiglitz 2015). Americans revere those said to have pulled themselves up by their
own bootstraps, a figurative feat born out a literal impossibility. With increasing levels of
inequality eroding SEM, Corak (2013) suggests that the American Dream is increasingly
becoming just that, a dream. He explains “Relatively less upward mobility of the least
advantaged is one reason why intergenerational mobility is lower in the United States than in
other countries to which Americans are often compared” (Corak 2013:97). It is for this reason
that he and others argue the American Dream is becoming increasingly more difficult to attain
(Griffith 2001, Jäntti et al. 2006; Noah 2012; Corak 2013; Stiglitz 2015).

Hypotheses for Income and Mobility
Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest that a stronger belief in mobility among the middle class, who
are more likely to experience mobility, skews the mean belief about mobility upward. I would
suggest that this perception mean is likely to differ more from the level of mobility experienced
by the working class than the upper class. The opportunity for mobility, particularly upward
mobility, is a belief that serves to validate the position of those with higher socio-economic
statuses and so I expect them to have similar views on mobility as those in the middle even if the
levels they experience are lower. An important consideration is that Jäntti et al. (2006) discuss
both upward and downward mobility, while the ISSP (2012) phrasing is more focused on upward
mobility. I hypothesize that there will be a significant difference in what those in the lowest
income quintile perceive it takes to get ahead compared to the middle and high income groups.
17

Specifically, I expect their responses to emphasize the ascribed and less individualistic
requirements for upward mobility indicating that the system is non-meritocratic so there is less
opportunity for mobility. I expect a more modest but still significant difference between the
middle and higher income groups, but not with lower levels in the high groups as is seen with
experienced mobility. Instead I expect higher income to correlate with a more meritocratic view
of what it takes to get ahead.

Attitudes Towards Public Assistance
Americans’ perceptions of mobility are culturally informed by deeply held beliefs such as
the American Dream and those perceptions influence support or opposition to public assistance
(Steensland 2006, Loseke and Beahm 2013). Since the American Dream is built upon ideas of
individualism, meritocracy, and equal opportunity it follows that it is most associated with
opposition to public assistance. Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony in society has
special meaning in the context of the American Dream. In the United States not only do the poor
adopt many of the dominant values of the rich, but this process is encouraged by the idea that
the poor can and will become rich. This idea, this dream, has survived generations even in the
face of relatively low levels socio-economic mobility.
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) framework offers a way to understand why even people at lower
income levels might adopt the values of those at higher income levels. Through symbolic
violence and the formation of habitus, dominant ideas like ‘the U.S is a meritocracy’ are
legitimized and internalized, becoming part of a person’s ideology (Bourdieu 1991; Appelrouth
and Edles 2012; Harrits 2013). Even someone who does not make a lot of money, but who has
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integrated the concept of the nation as a meritocracy into their world view might oppose welfare
on the basis of that meritocratic ideal (Bullock, Williams, and Limbert 2003). This meritocratic
ideal involves the assumption that people who work hard not just deserve success, but will
achieve success, and only those who do not can fall into poverty. The construction of
deservingness factors in heavily in the discourse on public assistance, with some people seen as
deserving or underserving based on a complicated set of culturally informed factors (Kingfisher
1999; Fullerton and Dixon 2009, Obrien and Major 2009; Guetzkow 2010; Hussey and PearsonMerkowitz 2011; Katz 2013). As Katz (2013) puts it, “This problem has been partly about the
allocation of finite resources and partly about the exercise of moral judgement” (P. xii).
The level of support or opposition to welfare varies based on income, race, and other
demographics of respondents. In keeping with Marxist conflict theory, those with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to oppose welfare (Bullock et al. 2003; Abner 2011; Epstein
2004), but the gap is not as large as might be expected based on a conflict framework (Epstein
2004; Treier and Hillygus 2009). Opposition to welfare can be part of a larger and more complete
individualistic, personal responsibility based, and freedom centered ideology that is not
perceived to be compatible with support for welfare. “Politics is not about individual choices
made in isolation; it is collective decision-making in circumstances where individual objectives
cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Druckman and Lupia 2000:19), meaning not only are there
competing interests between groups or individuals, but even an individual can possess
competing interests.
There is social psychological research that demonstrates in a related context the ease
with which beliefs that disadvantage individuals may, nevertheless, be adopted and supported
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by those very same individuals. In a series of experiments Ridgeway (2001) found potent effects
of interpersonal interactions on the formation and acceptance of unequal status constructions.
Of particular relevance here is the ease with which she found people will adopt such status
beliefs even when they are personally disadvantageous. Her finding that “interaction can spread
status beliefs from person to person throughout the population” (Ridgeway 2001:273) has
implications for views about welfare that may not seem to be in the viewer’s best interest. It
implies that such ideas are not only surprisingly easy to instill, but also to proliferate even among
those they work against.
Some of the opposition to welfare stems from American ideas of individualism,
meritocracy (Piketty 2014), and the assumption that welfare violates the Protestant work ethic
(Weber 1904; Hasenfeld 1989). The logic in such case is that anyone who worked hard enough
would not need such assistance and so they must be undeserving (Guetzkow 2010, Loseke and
Beahm 2013). This view does not acknowledge systemic causes of poverty. Americans tend to
favor individualist explanations for both wealth and poverty (Bullock et al. 2003; Collins and
Yeskel 2005; Piketty 2014), but this is true to a lesser extent for economically disadvantaged
groups. People of color, women, and those with lower incomes are more likely to favor structural
explanations (Bullock et al. 2003). Gans (1994) argues that “the notion of undeservingness
survives in part because of the positive functions it has for the better-off population” (P. 281). If
a millionaire argues that someone living in poverty is poor due to laziness, the corresponding
message is that he is rich because of hard work. A difference in attributions for wealth and
poverty also happens along ideological lines with liberals tending towards structural attributions
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and conservative favoring more individual explanations (Furnham 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986;
Bullock et al. 2003; Chambers et al. 2015; Davidai and Gilovich 2015).
The demographic makeup of public assistance recipients varies by program, location,
and over time. The levels of black identified and white identified recipients of benefits under the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, commonly referred to as welfare, has
remained very similar in recent years with black families making up 31.9% and white families
31.8% in 2010 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families 2012). Racial minorities may be overrepresented among TANF recipients in comparison
to the general population, but these nearly equal rates show racialized stereotypes of welfare
recipients are unfounded. The “queen” aspect of the welfare queen stereotype is equally as hard
to defend especially given the cuts to TANF and other public assistance programs, but the sex
skewed aspect is accurate. As of 2010 only 14.8% of adult TANF recipients were male (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families 2012).
Women and children are disproportionately represented as recipients of welfare for two clear
reasons. Since women average lower levels of pay compared to men in equivalent positions and
overall (Chauvin and Ash 1994; National Equal Pay Task Force 2013) they are more likely to
qualify for welfare. Women are also more likely to be the single heads of household with
dependent children.
Dorsch (2010) argues that “economies with higher degrees of social mobility will choose
lower levels of public consumption expenditures in equilibrium” (P. 37). This sentiment is echoed
by Bartels (2005) and Franko et al. (2013). Dorsch (2010) describes this as an intuitive
relationship. What is missing from much of this analysis is the consideration of the potential for
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a gap between perception and experienced SEM. What matters more for attitudes towards
public assistance is how people perceive the chance for upward mobility. The basis by which they
choose to explain economic success or failure determines the level of support (Nelson 1999;
Fong 2001; Bullock, et al. 2003; Robinson 2009; Guertzkow 2010). This is a potential explanation
for why those at the lower end of the SES spectrum do not necessarily support public assistance
at the levels one might expect based on their higher potential need for it (Bartels 2005; Gilens
2009; Dorsch 2010). Clearer understanding of these concepts has been shown to influence
individual’s policy opinions and allow them to better act in their own self-interest (Franko,
Tolbert, and Witko 2013). Despite this issue of perception that can cause people to adopt policies
that may not appear in their own self-interest, there is still a relationship found between SES
and attitudes towards public assistance with those with lower levels of SES more likely to
support (Fong 2001; Epstein 2004). By comparing perception of SEM to measured SEM at
different levels of SES, I hope to improve the understanding of this relationship.
The attribution of socio-economic status can be divided into three basic categories:
individual, structural, and fatalistic or having to do with luck (Bullock et al. 2003). In 2014
comments by Congressman Paul Ryan one of the reasons he cited for his belief in a selfreproducing culture of poverty was the work of Charles Murray (Bennett 2014; Kertscher 2014;
Weigel 2014). Though Ryan did not specify which work by Murray, in his most famous work, The
Bell Curve (1994), he and his co-writer Richard Herrnstein made an argument that fueled a still
raging debate about biological causes of stratification. The two argued that there are racial
differences in intelligence (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Their controls for social and
environmental factors were inadequate enough to make their findings suspect, but despite this,
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it has been fodder for those seeking to legitimize racial and other forms of inequality. Paul
appears to have been appealing to what Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) say is “racial
animosity” in the U.S. which “makes redistribution to the poor, who are disproportionately
black, unappealing to many voters” (P. 2). Gorski (2008) vehemently opposes these types of
arguments made by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) and echoed by Ryan (Bennett 2014). He
collectively calls it part of deficit theory, the idea that poverty is caused by some deficit within
individuals in poverty and that it is part of a culture of poverty (Bullock et al. 2003; Gorski 2008).
This is a plainly individualistic attribution for poverty and one that is not limited to one
congressman, but rather has been expressed by many during legislative sessions where welfare
was discussed (Loseke and Beahm 2013).
By demeaning and ‘othering’ people in poverty, often using racist stereotypes, those
who oppose welfare programs are able to make the target audience of such messages feel less
connected to and responsible for those in poverty (Hussey, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2011;
Fullerton and Dixon 2009). Beyond fighting efforts to maintain or increase spending on public
assistance programs, the rich by distancing themselves from the poor in this way reinforce the
idea that they have achieved their wealth and success through their own merits. People at any
point on the SES spectrum can make such judgments about those at lower levels. It is for this
reason, in part, that looking for variation in perception of SEM to measured SEM at different
levels of SES is important.
With racial or other kinds of negative stereotypes, members of the stereotyped group
may internalize those negative views about other members of the group while thinking of
themselves as an exception (Ellemers 2001). In this way, even targeted group of a negative
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stereotype may believe it and perpetuate it to their own detriment. Someone who needs public
assistance can also see themselves as in need due to circumstances beyond their control while
still simultaneously thinking others in need are responsible for their situations and not deserving
of help.
Adorno et al. (1950) state that a person’s political ideology “reflects his personality and
is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the ideological
environment” (P. 176). As such, a person’s personality is certainly reflected in his or her ideology
(Jost Federico, and Napier 2009) and it is also an aggregate of carefully selected and internalized
opinions (Bourdieu 1991). Such opinions can be selected on the basis consistency, even
consistency of opposition. An inter-disciplinary investigation of political attitudinal
development reveals strong support for the idea that “at the common environmental level, the
structure of attitudes is consistent with the sociological model of attitude formation that
suggests partisan rhetoric exaggerates the consistency between the social and economic
ideological preferences” (Verhulst, Hatemi, and Eaves 2012:390). This suggests that some who
may oppose welfare, do not do so because of any innate qualities of welfare as an issue, but
because they oppose those who support it.
Political polarization in the United States is at or near all-time highs depending on which
measures are used (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Jost et al. 2009; Treier and Hillygus
2009). Though liberals tend to be more likely to support welfare and conservatives more likely
to oppose, the high levels of polarization do not translate directly to a greater separation on the
issue of welfare. Trends in levels of support or opposition to welfare are complex, but overall
support appears to be diminishing over time and opposition rising (Epstein 2004). This is not a
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simple, progressive, downward slide, however. There is research suggesting that support rises
in difficult economic times (Kam and Nam 2008). Such exceptions to the downward trend hint
at the nature and cause of opposition to welfare. Research into this phenomenon suggests that
people’s perceptions of their own security, including economic security, is positively correlated
with support for welfare and other aspects of political orientation and ideology (Carney et al.
2008; Jost et al. 2009). This contradicts the idea that economic hardship might lead to pressure
for more austere public spending, showing that people’s increased sensitivity to the need for
welfare is stronger than budgetary concerns. It is for this reason among others that is it
important to note that the ISSP (2012) data were collected in the US during the recovery from
The Great Recession. The earlier version of the same survey conducted in 1999 (ISSP 2002) did
not include the question that serves as an indicator of support for or opposition to public
assistance in this research so no direct comparison is possible.

Hypotheses for Get Ahead and Public Assistance
Based on this previous research I expect that those who believe more strongly in
individualistic or meritocratic ways to get ahead will be less likely to support public assistance. I
also expect that respondents in demographics more likely to need or receive public assistance
will show stronger support for it.
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CHAPTER THREE:
DATA AND METHODS

The core of this research is quantitative analysis of data gathered as part of the Social
Inequality portion of the International Social Survey Programme (2012) beginning its fourth
round in 2009 worldwide1. In the United States, the data were collected as part of the General
Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. A multi-stage, stratified,
random sample of people 18 or older and not institutionalized were interviewed face to face
between March 18 and August 14, 2010 nationwide. The survey items of special interest in the
project are income, sex, race, views of what it takes to get ahead, and attitudes towards public
assistance. Sex and race are control variables. Though the survey included over 1,500 American
participants, 1,357 answered all of these survey items, therefore that is the sample size for this
analysis.
Since income levels are central to this analysis I continue this section with a detailed
discussion of the coding and other methodological considerations for this variable and how they
relate to subjective class identification. While subjective class identification is not a focus of this

1

The complete list of countries is Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
USA, and Venezuela.
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research, how people identify their own place in the hierarchy of socio-economic status is
relevant to their mobility related perceptions. The discussion of income is followed by an
explanation of the coding of the get ahead survey items and then the analysis for each of the
research questions. For RQ1A the independent variable is income and the dependents are views
of what it takes to get ahead. RQ1B involves comparison of those views broken down by income
to existing mobility data for those income groups. For RQ2 the independent variables are views
of what it takes to get ahead and the dependent variable is attitude towards spending on public
assistance.

Construction of Income Categories and Comparison to Class
For income, interviewers asked respondents “In which of these groups did your total
family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is” (Smith 2013:186).
Respondents had 25 income groups to choose from (See Appendix A). The income groups are
numerous and narrow enough to capture and represent the respondent’s income status, but
having the data grouped in this way rather than in exact dollar amounts necessitated recoding.
As they were, the bottom 20% of incomes made up the bottom 48% of the categories, 1-12 of
25. Using these skewed categories would produce skewed results. To correct for this I have
constructed two more representative coding schemes. The first uses the midpoint of the dollar
range for that group as the income for all respondents in that group. For example, for the
$20,000 to $22,499 group the mean rounded to the nearest dollar is $21,250, therefore $21,250
is used as the income for all respondents who reported their total family income fell in that
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group. The first group, $1,000 and less, is represented by $500. The last group, 25 of 25, $150,000
and over, is coded as $150,000 (See Appendix B).
The second coding scheme is based on the income quintiles similar to much previous
mobility research. To define the quintiles I chose the cut points that fell closest to 20%, 40%,
60%, and 80% of respondents in order to produce five groups with approximately equal numbers
of respondents, as close to equal as the predefined categories allowed. The first quintile includes
those who reported $19,999 or less of total family income, second quintile $20,000-34,999, third
$35,000-59,999, fourth $60,000-89,999, and the fifth quintile includes those who reported
$90,000 and over. For some methods of analysis I have combined the second, third, and fourth
quintiles to facilitate comparison to previous research where this is typical. This leaves a low
income category which includes only the first income quintile, a middle income category for the
second through fourth quintiles, and a high income category which includes only the top income
quintile.
Respondents were asked to report their own class in addition to family income. Though
issues of class are relevant here, income rather than class is the more useful measure for this
analysis for two reasons. First, since income, and especially income quintiles, is more typically
used for mobility research using the same approach here facilitates more meaningful
comparison to previous work. The second reason is the subjectivity and complexity of class
labels, which is likely why they are not favored in more research. Since class labels cannot be
depended upon and used in the same way income data can, income is the more meaningful and
useful measure. However, since how respondents identify their place in the class hierarchy is
relevant to work such as this regarding perceptions, it is worth further investigation.
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For class, respondents were given the choices lower, working, lower middle, middle,
upper middle, and upper class. Table 1 shows the cross tabulation of these classes collapsed into
three groups with the collapsed income quintiles previously described as well as and resulting
chi-square value.

Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Total Family Income and Self-Reported Class
Income
Low

Middle

High

Q1
$0 19,999

Q2, Q3, Q4
$20,000 89,999

Q5
$90,000 150,000+

146%

351%

45%

Total
542%

% within Low, Mid, or High Income

57%

43%

16%

40%

% of Total

11%

26%

3%

40%

101%

437%

166%

704%

39%

54%

59%

52%

χ² = 213.67, p < .001

Class

Total

Lower
and
Working

Count

Lower Middle
and
Middle

Count
% of Total

7%

32%

12%

52%

Upper Middle
and
Upper

Count

9%

25%

72%

106%

% within Low, Mid, or High Income

4%

3%

25%

8%

% of Total

1%

2%

5%

8%

Count

256%

813%

283%

1352%

% within Low, Mid, or High Income

100%

100%

100%

100%

19%

60%

21%

100%
n = 1352

% within Low, Mid, or High Income

% of Total

The chi-square value shows that there is a significant and strong relationship between
income and class. However, a closer look at the cross tabulation shows that income group does
not predict self-identified class in the pattern that might be assumed. The cross tabulation of
income and class reveals a notable number of respondents with low income identifying as
middle and upper class and high income respondents identifying as working or middle class.
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Only somewhat slim majorities of those in the low and middle income groups identify with the
superficially corresponding classes.
Most notably 39% of respondents in the lowest income quartile identified as lower
middle or middle class rather than lower or working class and 4% reported they were either
upper middle or upper class. Among those in the highest income quintile, only 25% identified as
upper or upper middle class. A majority of the highest income quintile, 59%, reported that they
were part of the lower middle or middle class. Another 16% of people in the highest income
quintile called themselves lower or working class. There are several potential reasons for this
seeming incongruity, but what is most important to this analysis is that there is a notable
incongruity. Respondents may have found it more comfortable to identify as middle class to the
interviewer. They may lack understanding of the class labels or have inaccurate ideas about their
meanings. This may also result from geographic differences in the cost of living. Though the
potential reasons are interesting, what is important for the purpose for this research is that
family income is the more "objective" indicator.

Coding of Getting Ahead Variables
For research question 1a, in order to assess differences in perception of mobility among
those at different income levels for RQ1a and compare those perceptions to measurements of
mobility for research question 1b, I used the following questions from the ISSP (2012) (See
Appendix A for survey materials showing these and other questions used in this research). These
will be referred to as the “get ahead” variables.
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1. Please show for each of these how important you think it is for
getting ahead in life. How important is…
a.) …coming from a wealthy family?
b.) …having well educated parents?
c.) …knowing the right people
d.) …hard work?
e.) …having ambition? (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201)

For each question, the interviewer presented respondents with an ordinal scale and asked them
to rate that survey item as “Essential (1), Very Important (2), Fairly Important(3), Not Very
Important (4), or Not important at all (5)” (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201). They were also given a
“Can’t choose” option which is not part of this analysis.
For some types of analyses all five of these variables are combined into a composite
measure representing each respondent’s overall attribution for what the survey calls “getting
ahead.” In the getting ahead composite the responses to 1a, 1b, and 1c have the original coding.
Note that the agreement with the first three statements indicates a non-meritocratic view of
what it takes to get ahead while agreement with the last two statements indicates a more
meritocratic perception. Therefore, in building the composite measure, the last two responses
must be reverse coded before they are added to the response scores from the first three
questions. In the getting ahead composite the responses to 1a, 1b, and 1c are coded as Essential
= 1, Very Important = 2, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very Important = 4, Not Important at All = 5.
For the questions 1d and 1e the coding is reversed for the composite only, so that Essential = 5,
Very Important = 4, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very Important = 2, and Not Important at All = 1.
The sum of the values from answers to all five of the getting ahead variables with this recoding
comprise the getting ahead composite. Since there are five component variables with scales of
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1 through 5, the scale or possible range of the composite is 5 through 25. Here is an example of
the composite calculation.

Table 2. Calculation Example for Getting Ahead Composite
Coding

Original

Reversed

Essential = 1
Very Important = 2
Fairly Important = 3
Not Very Important = 4
Not Important at All = 5
Essential = 5
Very Important = 4
Fairly Important = 3
Not Very Important = 2
Not Important at All = 1

Variable

Response

Value

Wealthy Family

Not Very Important

4

Educated Parents

Essential

1

Know Right People

Not Very Important

4

Hard Work

Essential

5

Ambition

Fairly Important

3

Getting Ahead Composite Score:
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With this coding higher numbers in the sum will represent a more meritocratic perception
indicative of a belief in greater opportunity for upward mobility. Questions 1a, 1b, and 1c
represent an inherited route to high SES implying a rigid social structure with limited SEM, so
disagreement with this is scored highly. Questions 1d and 1e represent a route with individual
agency allowing for the greater possibility of SEM with fewer ascribed impediments, so
agreement is scored highly. Furthermore, because of this difference it is expected that 1a, 1b,
and 1c will be negatively correlated with 1d and 1e.

RQ1A and RQ1B – Income, Perceptions of Opportunity for Mobility, and Mobility
The first set of results is from an analysis of the responses to each getting ahead item by
income quintile. The expectation is that the lowest income quintile will differ significantly from
the middle and upper ones and display mobility perceptions that skew towards the less
meritocratic and more inherited modes of getting ahead. Though the upper quintile has been
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found to have lower levels of mobility than the middle quintiles (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al.
2008), I do not expect that to equate to more limited perceptions of opportunity for mobility
because a meritocratic view of opportunity for mobility serves to validate the SES of those in
this group.
This analysis is elaborated by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the income
categories (low, middle, and high) as the independent variable and the getting ahead composite
as the dependent variable. This facilitates a comparison among income groups with respect to
their average level of perceived opportunity for mobility. Further, it allows for additional
confirmation or refutation of the suggestion that greater opportunity for mobility is perceived
by those in the middle income quintiles pushing up the average and obscuring the lower
opportunity for mobility perceived by those with lower income. The next step involves a
comparison of the perceptions of each income group to the levels of mobility typically found in
other research for respondents in these quintiles. This makes it possible to determine if the
perceptions are related to differences in experienced mobility.
The next step involves a comparison of the perceptions of each income group to the
levels of mobility found in other research. This makes it possible to determine if the perceptions
are notably different from experienced mobility levels. Without such a difference an unrealistic
perception could not be responsible a lack of political pressure for changes to public policy that
would promote mobility as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggest.

33

RQ2 – Perceptions of Opportunity for Mobility and Attitudes Towards Public Assistance
For the final research question (RQ2) about the relationship between Americans’
perceptions of socio-economic mobility and attitudes towards public assistance, the following
question will represent the level of support or opposition to public assistance.

2. Do you agree or disagree?
a.) The government should spend less on benefits for the
poor (Smith et al. 2013: 2198-2201)

In the survey the answers available and their coding are strongly agree = 1, agree = 2, neither =
3, disagree = 4, and strongly disagree = 5. With this coding scheme lower scores indicate
opposition to public assistance, while higher scores indicate support for public assistance. For
simplicity, this variable is referred to as attitudes towards public assistance. I performed a
multiple linear regression with the individual get ahead variables as the predictors or
independent variables and attitudes towards public assistance as the dependent. Controls for
income, sex, and race were also added in a second regression model for the purpose of
comparison. Rather than the low, middle, and high income categories used in the ANOVA, the
regression was completed using income in the previously described five quintiles. A simplified
race variable was required because of sample size limitations. It included one category for
respondents who identified as “white” coded as 0 and another category for respondents who
identified as “black” or “other” coded as 1. For sex the categories were male (0) and female (1).
Rather than the low, middle, and high income categories used in the ANOVA, analysis
for RQ2 involves regressions including income in two other forms. The first uses income quintiles
like the ANOVA, but unlike the ANOVA uses all five instead of grouping them into low, middle,
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and high. The second uses dollar amounts representative of each of the income categories that
respondents were able to choose from as previously discussed in this section (see Appendix B).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables. The
standard deviations are high for the public assistance, getting ahead, and income variables
relative to their ranges showing that there is a great deal of dispersion. Looking at the individual
get ahead variables, the ones indicative of ascribed modes of getting ahead (wealthy family,
educated parents, and knowing the right people) are all significantly and moderately correlated.
Similarly, the variables more associated with meritocratic views of what it takes to get ahead
(hard work and ambition) are also significantly correlated, but more strongly. Despite this, only
three of the six possible correlations between the systemic and meritocratic variables are
significant and only one of those is negative. This does not support the hypothesis that these
two contrasting types of variables would all be negatively correlated. The two that were
significantly and negatively correlated can be considered the most representative of each of
their types. The wealthy parents variable epitomizes the systemic and unmeritocratic
contingent and hard work is most representative of the individualistic and meritocratic variables.
The two codings of income, predictably, have a significant and extremely strong correlation,
.935. The difference in their correlations with other variables are also no more than .016 showing
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Table 3. Descriptives and Correlations for Get Ahead Variables and Attitudes Towards Public Assistance
Public
Assistance

Wealthy
Family

Educated
Parents

Know
Right
People

Hard
Work

Ambition

Getting
Income
Ahead
Quintile
Composite

Income
$
Midpoint

Sex

Race

Mean

3.570

3.133

2.590

2.560

1.590

1.680

17.016

3.028

57977.89 0.539

0.221

Standard Deviation

1.024

1.074

0.875

0.860

0.592

0.661

2.333

1.401

41960.51 0.499

0.415

Public Assistance

--

Wealthy Family

-.067**

--

Educated Parents

-.126**

.399**

Know Right People

-.093**

.366**

.312**

Hard Work

_.085**

-.054**

.044**

.067**

--

Ambition

_.056**

.013**

.026**

.156**

.476**

--

Getting Ahead Composite

-.149**

.755**

.655**

.593**

-.372**

-.331**

--

Income Quintile

-.198**

.100**

.116**

.110**

-.074**

-.099**

.178**

Income Dollars

-.191**

.099**

.105**

.111**

-.076**

-.102**

.174**

.935**

--

Sex

_.026**

.053**

-.003**

.036**

-.053**

-.006**

.052**

-.120**

-.104**

Race

_.132**

-.146**

-.202**

-.191**

.026**

.066**

-.238**

-.163**

-.151**

*p < .05

**p < .01

---

(one-tailed test)

--

-.022**

--

n = 1357
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that they represent respondents’ incomes similarly. They are significantly correlated with every
other variable as well making it likely that income will have predictive power in this analysis.
Notably, income has a weak to moderate, but solidly significant, correlation with the getting
ahead composite and public assistance.
Race is significantly though weakly correlated with public assistance. With the 0 = white,
1 = all racial identifications other than white coding, this means white respondents were less
likely to support public assistance. It is impossible to determine the cause for this, however,
based on these data. Therefore, no conclusions can be made regarding findings like those of
Alesina (et al. 2001) that racial animosity is the source of opposition to public assistance by white
respondents. The high correlation of income and relationship between race and income also
begs the question of whether the effect of income is being captured in the race-public assistance
correlation.
Of all variables, sex has the lowest number of significant correlations and all of them are
weak. Of the getting ahead variables, sex only correlated significantly with wealthy family and
hard work. Since male = 0 and female = 1 the positive weak correlation with wealthy family and
equally negative correlation with hard work implies a slight tendency toward systemic or
inherited attributions for upward mobility. The negative correlation between sex and income
seen here is as expected based on the well-established trend of females earning less than males
(National Equal Pay Task Force 2013). Notably, sex is not significantly correlated with attitudes
towards public assistance which is interesting considering females are disproportionally
represented among TANF recipients.
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Most of the correlations are weak or moderate excluding the designedly strong
correlations of the composite with its constituent variables and the two different methods of
coding income. Some of the significant correlations suggest that other analysis will reveal
significant results.

Income and Perception of Opportunity for Upward Mobility
The tables below show the cross tabulations of the get ahead variables and income and
the chi-square value for each. The cells with greater than expected values are shaded for the
tables with significant chi-square values.

Table 4. Importance of Wealthy Family to Getting Ahead by Income
How important is coming from a wealthy family?
χ² = 33.80, p < .001
Essential
Low,
Q1

Mid,
Income
Q2-Q4

High,
Q5

Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count

Fairly

Not
Very

Not At
All

Total

22

79

70

54

33

258

13.3

64.3

84.8

66.0

29.7

258.0

8.5%

30.6%

27.1%

20.9%

12.8%

100.0%

41

205

254

219

97

816

42.1

203.2

268.2

208.7

93.8

816.0

5.0%

25.1%

31.1%

26.8%

11.9%

100.0%

7

54

122

74

26

283

14.6

70.5

93.0

72.4

32.5

283.0

2.5%

19.1%

43.1%

26.1%

9.2%

100.0%

70

338

446

347

156

1357

Expected Count

70.0

338.0

446.0

347.0

156.0

1357.0

% within Income

5.2%

24.9%

32.9%

25.6%

11.5%

100.0%

% within High Income
Count

Total

Very

n = 1357
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Table 5. Importance of Educated Parents to Getting Ahead by Income
How important is having well educated parents?
χ² = 30.78, p < .001
Essential
Low,
Q1

Mid,
Income
Q2-Q4

High,
Q5

Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within High Income
Count

Total

Very

Fairly

Not
Very

Not At
All

Total

29

132

72

20

5

258

19.0

108.8

96.2

26.8

7.2

258.0

11.2%

51.2%

27.9%

7.8%

1.9%

100.0%

54

340

303

93

26

816

60.1

344.0

304.3

84.8

22.9

816.0

6.6%

41.7%

37.1%

11.4%

3.2%

100.0%

17

100

131

28

7

283

20.9

119.3

105.5

29.4

7.9

283.0

6.0%

35.3%

46.3%

9.9%

2.5%

100.0%

100

572

506

141

38

1357

Expected Count

100.0

572.0

506.0

141.0

38.0

1357.0

% within Income

7.4%

42.2%

37.3%

10.4%

2.8%

100.0%
n = 1357

Table 6. Importance of Knowing the Right People to Getting Ahead by Income
How important is knowing the right people?
χ² = 51.55, p < .001
Essential

Income

Count

Low,
Q1

Expected Count

Mid,
Q2-Q4

Expected Count

High,
Q5

% within Low Income
Count

Fairly

Not
Very

Not At
All

Total

39

115

75

20

9

258

26.8

92.0

109.5

26.0

3.6

258.0

15.1%

44.6%

29.1%

7.8%

3.5%

100.0%

74

293

349

91

9

816

84.8

291.0

346.4

82.4

11.4

816.0

9.1%

35.9%

42.8%

11.2%

1.1%

100.0%

28

76

152

26

1

283

29.4

100.9

120.1

28.6

4.0

283.0

9.9%

26.9%

53.7%

9.2%

0.4%

100.0%

141

484

576

137

19

1357

Expected Count

141.0

484.0

576.0

137.0

19.0

1357.0

% within Income

10.4%

35.7%

42.4%

10.1%

1.4%

100.0%

% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within High Income
Count

Total

Very

n = 1357
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Table 7. Importance of Hard Work to Getting Ahead by Income
How important is hard work?
χ² = 11.57, p = .171
Essential
Low,
Q1

Mid,
Income
Q2-Q4

High,
Q5

Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within High Income
Count

Total

Very

Not
Very

Fairly

Not At
All

Total

96

150

10

1

1

258

116.7

130.6

9.5

0.8

0.4

258.0

37.2%

58.1%

3.9%

0.4%

0.4%

100.0%

380

400

32

3

1

816

369.2

413.1

30.1

2.4

1.2

816.0

46.6%

49.0%

3.9%

0.4%

0.1%

100.0%

138

137

8

0

0

283

128.0

143.3

10.4

0.8

0.4

283.0

48.8%

48.4%

2.8%

0.0%

0.0%

100.0%

614

687

50

4

2

1357

Expected Count

614.0

687.0

50.0

4.0

2.0

1357.0

% within Income

45.2%

50.6%

3.7%

0.3%

0.1%

100.0%
n = 1357

Table 8. Importance of Having Ambition Getting Ahead by Income
How important is having ambition?
χ² = 24.38, p = .002
Essential

Income

Count

Low,
Q1

Expected Count

Mid,
Q2-Q4

Expected Count

High,
Q5

% within Low Income
Count

Fairly

Not
Very

Not At
All

Total

90

137

22

8

1

258

107.2

129.9

17.9

2.7

0.4

258.0

34.9%

53.1%

8.5%

3.1%

0.4%

100.0%

338

417

54

6

1

816

339.1

410.7

56.5

8.4

1.2

816.0

41.4%

51.1%

6.6%

0.7%

0.1%

100.0%

136

129

18

0

0

283

117.6

142.4

19.6

2.9

0.4

283.0

48.1%

45.6%

6.4%

0.0%

0.0%

100.0%

564

683

94

14

2

1357

Expected Count

564.0

683.0

94.0

14.0

2.0

1357.0

% within Income

41.6%

50.3%

6.9%

1.0%

0.1%

100.0%

% within Low Income
Count
Expected Count
% within High Income
Count

Total

Very

n = 1357
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The chi-square values for the get ahead variables were all significant except for the hard
work variable. There was a clear trend in the answers to the question of how important hard
work is to getting ahead, but it was mostly uniform across all income groups. Over 95% of
respondents regardless of income answered that hard work was either essential or very
important. Even though the overall relationship to income was not significant, within those two
answers the distribution did vary by income in a clear way. Those in the lowest income trended
more towards very important rather than essential with 37.2% calling it essential and 58.1%
calling very important. This is in contrast to the middle and high income groups who answered
46.6% essential and 49% very important, and 48.1% essential and 45.6% very important
respectively.
The survey also included a question about the importance of getting an education
yourself. In fact, a great deal of mobility research focuses on educational attainment. Like the
hard work question it was also not significant in certain types of preliminary testing. However, I
choose not to include it while including hard work because the self-education results do not have
as many implications beyond the perceived importance of education to getting ahead. The get
ahead survey items included here have more clear implications about the respondents’
attributions for mobility beyond those individual questions. They are all easily categorized as
representative of a more meritocratic perception or a more systemic view. Getting a college
degree is easier and more likely for those in higher income groups, but it ostensibly requires
talent, skills, and hard work making the implications of the survey question mixed in a way that
made it less useful to this research.
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The survey question about knowing the right people could hypothetically work in a
similar way with overlap between being to some degree inherited and some degree self-made.
However, it since the right people in this context are presumably people with higher socioeconomic status it seems more likely that someone would know “the right people” if he or she
was also part of that social stratum even if it is not absolutely required. It is impossible to know
how respondents conceptualized “knowing the right people,” however, the moderate positive
correlation of this variable with variables such as wealthy parents suggests a similar line of
thought or association.
In the tables for the ascribed traits, Table 4, wealthy family, Table 5, educated parents,
and Table 6, knowing the right people, there is trend opposite of what Table 8, ambition, an
achieved characteristic, displays. In Tables 4, Table 5, and Table 6 the low income group tends
to have greater than expected counts in the essential and very important categories. This shows
that those in the lowest income group are more likely to perceive inherited traits as important
to getting ahead and therefore see opportunity for mobility through individual effort as more
limited. The middle income group tends to exceed expected counts closer to the other end of
the answer spectrum particularly calling them not very important. This points to more
meritocratic perceptions of what it takes to get ahead since they find these inherited traits as
less important. The implications of the answers of the high income group are less clear since
their counts tend to exceed expected around the middle for wealthy family, educated parents,
and knowing the right people. These trends is most clear with wealthy family and educated
parents, but it is also present with know the right people. Looking at all of the shaded areas this
trend is present, but less focused. It is even more visible when focusing on the cells where the
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difference between the expected and actual counts is larger when adjusted for the size of the
expected count.
With ambition the trends for the low and middle income groups are reversed which is
unsurprising given that placing importance on ambition, an achieved characteristic, runs
counter to placing importance on inherited characteristics such as having wealthy parents.
Though significant, the relationship between income and believing ambition is an important
part of getting ahead is not as strong as wealthy family, educated parents, or knowing the right
people. Like hard work, all income groups seemed to believe strongly in the importance of
ambition to getting ahead. Also like hard work this is more true the higher the income of the
respondent. Even though all income groups tend to report ambition is important, the lower the
income, the less strongly a respondent is likely to feel about it.
To elaborate upon the relation between income and the get ahead variables, I next use
the same collapsed income quintiles but with the get ahead composite rather than the individual
variables for a different type of analysis. A one-way (ANOVA) with collapsed income quintiles
(low, middle, and high) as the independent variable and the getting ahead composite as the
dependent also indicated that mobility perceptions do vary with income. The ANOVA yielded
significant results, F(2, 1354) = 18.022, p < .001, r = 0.03. Though significant even at the p < .001
level, the effect size of 0.03 is small. This suggests that Jäntti et al. (2006) were correct in their
assertion that perception of mobility is different based on class, but the effect may not be large
enough to explain much of the phenomena they hypothesize result from this difference. Post
hoc testing using Tukey’s HSD reveals that the significant result in the ANOVA is driven entirely
by a significant difference between the low income group and the other groups. The descriptive
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statistics below show a small difference between the middle and high income groups, but
Tukey’s HSD indicates it is not significant.

18.0

17.12
(2.31)

17.5

17.39
(2.09)

Mean (SD)

17.0
16.5

16.27
(2.51)

16.0
15.5
15.0

(n = 1357)

Low

Middle

High

(Q1)

(Q2-Q4)

(Q5)

Income

Figure 1. Getting Ahead Composite Means

Figure 1 shows the mean getting ahead composite scores. Since the composite is the
sum of the five getting ahead measures coded with the more individualistic or meritocratic
answers as higher values, higher composite values represent more meritocratic views and a
perception of opportunity for mobility. The range of possible values for the getting ahead
composite is 5 to 25, therefore the means in Figure 1 show an overall trend towards the higher
end of this measure. This suggests that respondents perceive high levels of opportunity for
mobility in all income categories, though to varying degrees. Across all incomes the actual range
(rather than possible range) was 11-25 with a mean of 17.02, median of 17, and mode of 17
resulting from a nearly perfectly symmetrical distribution.
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As hypothesized the lower income group perceives less opportunity for mobility through
individual effort than other groups, though still more than most previous research would
suggest. The gap between the means of the low income and middle income group is larger than
the difference between the middle and high groups, but is not as large as expected based on
differences in levels of mobility found in previous research (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008).
These differences are not great enough to offer strong support for arguments made by Griffith
(2001) and echoed by Jäntti et al. (2006) that those in lower income brackets are fully aware of
their relatively limited chances for upward mobility, while those in the middle class are relatively
confident in their chances for advancement. Though the levels of opportunity for mobility
perceived are quite tightly grouped, the pattern does not diverge entirely from previous theories
and findings. The low income group does have the most limited view of mobility and there is a
larger rise in the mean between the low and middle than between the middle and upper. Though
this pattern does not match measurements of mobility, the differentiation between those with
the lowest incomes and everyone else is in line with past research on perceptions of inequality
(Xu and Garand 2010).

Comparison to Measured Mobility
Since the range for the getting ahead composite is 20, multiplying the means by five puts
them on the same scale as the measured percentage chances of mobility. These adjusted
perception means are low 81.35, middle 85.60, and high 86.95. This pattern of perception of
mobility has ways in which it is both similar to and different from the levels of experienced or
measured mobility found in previous research. Despite the challenges in measuring mobility and
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the resulting inconsistencies, there is a trend among research on different levels of mobility for
different income groups. Jäntti et al. (2006) found 57.8% mobility for the lowest quintile, 75% in
the middle (Q2-Q4), and 66% at the top using data from the National Longitudinal Study of
Youth. Similarly, Isaacs et al. (2008) found 58% at the bottom, 74% in the middle and 61% at the
top using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from a similar period. Studies reliably
find lower levels of mobility or more stickiness in the bottom and top income quintiles compared
to the middle (Carroll et al. 2006; Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008).
The pattern and levels do not match the perception results here. However, as previously
discussed, the perception of the chance at upward mobility of those in the top income quintile
may be expected to be high relative to levels of mobility experienced because of the selfjustifying nature of such a belief. Setting the high income perceptions aside for this reason and
focusing on the perceptions of those in the low and middle groups, it is clear that the relative
positions of the income groups do essentially match. Compared to the middle income group,
there is both less mobility experienced and perceived, though both perception means are quite
high and the difference between the low and middle perceptions is not as large as the difference
in experienced mobility. The most obvious reason for this discrepancy is the idea of the
American Dream and the tendency of Americans to overestimate the possibility for upward
mobility (Jäntti et al. 2006; Isaacs et al. 2008; Bengali and Daly 2013; Bjørnskov et al. 2013; Corak
2013; Kraus and Tan 2015).
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Perceptions of Mobility and Support for Public Assistance
Looking at the correlations in Table 3, all of the get ahead variables are significantly
correlated with support for public assistance and in the directions hypothesized. A stronger
belief that the ascribed characteristics, wealthy family, educated parents, and knowing the right
people are required to get ahead is positively correlated with support for public assistance. This
implies that a structural view of mobility and opportunities for mobility makes a person more
likely to support spending on public assistance. Also in keeping with the hypothesis, a stronger
belief in the importance of the attained characteristics, hard work and ambition, is negatively
correlated with support for public assistance. This implies that those who have more
individualistic views and see more opportunity for mobility are less likely to support spending on
public assistance.
Looking at the control variables, again income was more strongly correlated with
support for public assistance than any of the get ahead variables. The individual get ahead
variables were more suitable for this regression rather than the composite for the purpose of
examining their individual relationships with the public assistance variable. However, since the
correlation of income with public assistance was higher than with any of the get ahead variables,
a comparison to the getting ahead composite is called for to look for their combined effect. For
the get ahead composite and support for public assistance r = -.149, p < .001, which is still a
weaker correlation than that of income. As the ANOVA also showed, however, income is a
significant predictor of a respondent’s perceptions of what it takes to get ahead, so the get
ahead variables already incorporate some of the effects of income in the above correlation
where income is not controlled for.
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Sex was the only variable tested that was not significantly correlated with support for
public assistance. Race, however, was second only to income in the strength of its correlation.
These two results are not as hypothesized based on who is more likely to receive public
assistance such as TANF. This suggests that something other than who actually receives such
benefits is significantly affecting support or lack thereof for spending on such programs. The fact
that the two strongest correlations with public assistance were income and race and that their
addition to the model more than doubled the effect size suggests that they are more important
determinants of support for public assistance than any of the get ahead variables. Setting aside
the differences in the strengths of these correlations, even all of the significant correlations with
support for public assistance must be considered weak since none even reach .20.
To more stringently test for a relationship between views of what it takes to get and
attitudes towards public assistance I performed the following regression analysis. A multiple
linear regression produced significant but weakly effective predictive models for support for
public assistance. The coefficients are in Table 9 below. Model 1 includes all of the get ahead
variables as predictors. Model 2 includes all of the get ahead variables plus income as quintiles,
sex, and race. Model 3 includes all of the get ahead variables plus income as the category
midpoint in dollars, sex, and race. For model 1 F(5,1351) = 7.948, p < .001 with an R2 = .029
(adjusted R2 = .025) showing it accounted for only 2.9% of the variance in support for public
assistance. For Model 2 F(8,1348) = 11.321, p < .001 with an R2 = .064 (adjusted R2 = .058) showing
that is accounted for only 6.4% of the variance in support for public assistance. For Model 3
F(8,1348) = 11.091, p < .001 with an R2 = .062 (adjusted R2 = .057) showing that is accounted for
only 6.2% of the variance in support for public assistance.
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Table 9. Models of Predictors of Attitudes Towards Public Assistance
Model 1, R² = .029

b

SE b

Intercept

3.795**

0.135

Wealthy Family

0.007**

0.029

0.008

Educated Parents

-0.129**

0.035

Know Right People

-0.085**

Hard Work
Ambition

β

Model 2, R² = .064

Model 3, R² = .062

(Income Quintiles)

(Income $ Midpoint)

b

SE b

β

SE b

β

3.863**

0.146

0.016

0.015**

0.029

0.016

-0.111

-0.101** 0.035 -0.086

-0.103**

0.035

-0.088

0.035

-0.072

-0.054** 0.035 -0.045

-0.053**

0.035

-0.045

0.138**

0.053

0.080

0.131**

0.052

0.075

0.049**

0.048

0.032

0.012** 0.047 -0.008

0.012**

0.047

0.008

-0.120** 0.020 -0.164

-3.871**

0.000

-0.159

Income

4.003** 0.153

b

0.015** 0.029

0.130** 0.052

0.075

Sex

0.019** 0.055

0.009

0.019**

0.055

0.013

Race

0.194** 0.068

0.079

0.194**

0.068

0.081

*p < .05

**p < .01

(one-tailed test)

n = 1357

The addition of income, sex, and race more than doubled the still weak predictive power
of the model making the get ahead variables look like weaker predictors by comparison. Before
introducing the controls three of the five get ahead variables appear to be significant predictors,
educated parents, know the right people, and hard work. After controlling for income, sex, and
race, only educated parents, and hard work are still significant. Though not all of the get ahead
variables are significant predictors of attitudes towards public assistance as hypothesized, the
ones that are significant do have the relationships of the hypothesized types. Since the get
ahead questions are coded as Essential = 1, Very Important = 2, Fairly Important = 3, Not Very
Important = 4, Not Important at All = 5, the negative coefficient for educated parents show that
those who say it less important are less likely to support public assistance. This fits with the
hypothesis and earlier findings that those who feel ascribed characteristics are less important to
getting ahead and therefore see more opportunity for mobility through individual effort, will be
more likely to oppose spending on public assistance. Similarly, those who have less meritocratic
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views on what it takes to get ahead and answered that hard work was less important to getting
ahead, were more likely to support spending public assistance.
Just as it was individually in the correlations, sex was also not significant as part of Model
2 or Model 3. Looking at the standardized betas income is the strongest predictor with race and
the two significant get ahead variables all around the same lower levels. Income has a negative
relationship with support for public assistance; higher income respondents were more likely to
oppose spending on public assistance. Since race was coded as white = 0 and all races other than
white = 1, the positive coefficient indicates that white respondents were significantly less likely
to support public assistance as predicted and suggested by previous research.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION

There is a relationship between income and views of what it takes to get ahead. Though
the views of mobility found in this research seem relatively high at each income level compared
to measured mobility, the lower income group has more limited views of mobility than the
middle income group which mirrors the lower levels of experienced mobility of the lowest
income quintile compared to the middle three. Furthermore, views on the importance of
educated parents and working hard are significant predictors of attitudes on public assistance.
As predicted, belief in the less meritocratic indicator, educated parents was associated with
support for public assistance while those who thought hard work was more important were less
likely to support it. Income proved to be a stronger predictor, however.
Americans’ overestimation of the level of mobility in the U.S. may or may not be
impacting public policy preferences as Jäntti et al. (2006) suggested, but since the effects of
perception of what it takes to get ahead here were weak and limited, any lack of pressure for
policies to reduce inequalities is difficult to attribute to it as they suggest. However, looking back
to the getting ahead composite means for the three income groups, perhaps even among the
group who saw the least opportunity for mobility, the perception was still too strong to facilitate
a desire for different policies.
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The findings in this research that low income and non-white respondents were less likely
to believe in meritocratic ways of getting ahead contrasts with the findings of Davidai and
Gilovich (2015). They found that lower income and non-white respondents perceived upward
mobility was more likely than did higher income and white respondents (Davidai and Gilovich
2015). Rather than views that justified their relative positions they found that “Those who have
more to lose from the current financial system, it seems, are more likely to see it as more
dynamic” (Davidai and Gilovich 2015:64). While apparent disagreement of the results of this
research and theirs cannot be fully explained there are important methodological differences.
The first difference is that their data are more recent, collected in 2014, so a change in
the general economic outlook over time is possible, but unlikely to be this extreme. Second, the
data were collected completely online so respondents were less likely to temper their answers
because of concerns of judgement by an interviewer, but perhaps more likely to give the
questions less thought. It is unclear whether they took steps to ensure that the requirement of
internet access did not result in a skewed sample. Most importantly, however, they directly
asked people hypothetical questions about the chances of a person in a given income quintile
making it to a different specific quintile. For the lowest they asked for the chances of that
hypothetical person moving up two quintiles or more. This is quite different from asking
questions about what it takes to get ahead which has more to do with opportunity for mobility
rather than experienced mobility.
As stated previously the distinction between opportunity for mobility and experienced
mobility is often not made. There is also not sufficient research on how people tend to
conceptualize each. Can it be assumed that if someone is not upwardly mobile it is because he
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or she did not have opportunity, or can we allow for the possibility that a person has
opportunities they do not exploit? In considering opportunities not taken, how could that be
measured? What obstacles would be considered? None of this is well defined. In Davidai and
Gilovich’s (2015) were the participants intended to assume that the hypothetical situations they
were asked about were governed by the presence or lack of opportunity for mobility or were
they intended to make judgements about that individual’s ability to control his or her own fate?
Opportunity for mobility could hypothetically come in many forms. As an example,
acquaintance A could tell acquaintance B that acquaintance A’s employer is trying to recruit
someone with acquaintance B’s skills for a prestigious job that pays more than he is currently
making. Acquaintance A could offer to recommend acquaintance B to his employer making him
far more likely to get the job. Acquaintance B could chose to follow up on the opportunity or not.
If he does not end up pursuing and getting the position, this would not be captured on any
measure of experienced mobility, but he still had the opportunity. However, it conceivably could
be encompassed by the knowing the right people survey question used in this research.
Research that includes measures that assess a respondent’s views on opportunity for
mobility as well as asking questions similar to those used by Davidai and Gilovich (2015) would
allow important and never before possible comparison of such views. Since perception of
mobility is an under researched area, more research is needed of this kind and others.
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CHAPTER SIX:
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Though there are a number of factors that could impact the results related to the support
for public assistance variable, but it is not clear that even if those were somehow controlled for
that the get ahead variables would become stronger predictors. First, the phrasing of the
question in the survey might have been suggestive. Though a Likert scale was used for the
answers, the question’s phrasing as “The government should spend less on benefits to the poor”
(ISSP 2012) might have been suggestive and resulted in the low to moderate mean of 2.433 when
recoded as support for public assistance where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree.
Further, “benefits to the poor” may not have been interpreted by respondents as public
assistance but rather any number of other government spending programs that the respondent
may have had other feelings about.
Also, as previously noted, these data were collected in mid-2010, only a year into the
recovery following the official end of The Great Recession (Nation Bureau of Economic Research
2010). Previous research has established that such conditions can increase support for public
assistance (Carney et al. 2008; Jost et al 2009; Kam and Nam 2008). However, the issue here is
more complex than simple support or opposition, but more its correlation with perceptions of
what it takes to get ahead, so it is not safe to make any kind of adjustments or assumptions
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based on the timing of the data collection. Regarding the coding of income, using the dollar
value of the midpoint for each category intuitively seems like it would be a more representative
coding scheme where possible. It is important to remember, however, that the greater than
$150,000 category, which 93 respondents of 1357 said they were a part of, was represented by
$150,000. Exact figures would have made the most difference for this category and likely would
have produced stronger results.
One additional consideration in interpreting the results of this research is that this
perception data focuses on upward mobility rather than both upward and downward. However,
adding the possibility for downward mobility could only add to the already high mobility
perceptions found here, therefore this does not explain the differences in the perception results
in this work and the results from previous work on experienced mobility. As previously
addressed, another potential limitation is that the get ahead questions are representative of
how important the respondents believe specific characteristics are to upward mobility, so the
results do not translate as directly to levels of mobility as the results produced by Davidai and
Gilovich (2015) and Chambers et al. (2015). More work of both types is needed, however.
Research that incorporates wealth rather than just income is also too scarce. Wealth appears to
be a less common measure because the data is even more difficult to obtain, but since wealth is
a better indicator of SES than income, it could produce results more representative of real world
experience.
Previous research on beliefs about mobility and the causes of poverty has been used to
contextualize the results of research on perceptions of mobility and inequality in this and other
research, but it essentially amounts to well informed speculation if it is not part of the data.
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Taking the best aspects of this research and studies where the questions more directly
addressed levels of mobility is the next logical step. Research where respondents are asked not
just for their assessments of mobility, but also for the reasons for those views would provide the
most valuable insight. Similarly, the relationship between opportunity for mobility and achieved
mobility may be in need of further clarification. Furthermore, though income was the most
important demographic issue in this work and sex and race were also incorporated, future
research of a similar kind examining differences in perceptions based on age and other
demographics would be a useful addition to the literature. Because of sample size and other
limitations, this data did not lend itself to a detailed examination of possible effects of
intersectionality of such variables, though such work could provide valuable insight.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSIONS

As hypothesized Jäntti et al. (2006) were correct that there are different perceptions of
mobility at different income levels and that difference could partially explain why the average
perception is higher than measurements of mobility. The effect shown in the data was in line
with their suggestion, but it was too small to account for the incongruously high American
perceptions of mobility that Jäntti et al. (2006) suggested are the result of the income based
differences. As they also maintained, such perceptions do have an impact on ideas about public
policy such as spending on public assistance. Here also though, such perceptions and even
income only explain a small part of the variance. There are clearly other forces at work not
captured in these data.
Given the higher perception of those in the middle experiencing more mobility and those
at the top who have other reasons to perceive more opportunity for mobility, it is not surprising
that average perceptions are not matching the experiences of those at the bottom. Again,
however, this is only a partial explanation since even when compared to countries with similar
levels of mobility at the middle, the US perceives more. While comparing perceived mobility to
experienced mobility is difficult to do with precision, international comparisons help to highlight
discrepancies. It seems that after accounting for income based differences, there is still simply
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an American difference that is not accounted for by this data. The American Dream lives on in
the mind even if not in the bank account.
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Appendix A - Survey Materials

GSS Codebook P. 160 – Respondent’s Sex

GSS Codebook P. 161 – Respondent’s Race
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GSS Codebook P. 186 – Total Family Income

72

GSS Codebook P. 2198-2201 – Get Ahead Variables

73

Note: The GSS codebook does not contain the exact phrasing for the 2010 versions of the class
and public assistance variables. See frequency tables in Appendix B.
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Appendix B - Frequency Tables
The frequency tables below include only the cases used in this research.

Respondent's Sex (SEX)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Male

625

46.1%

46.1%

Female

732

53.9%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Respondent's Race (RACE)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

White

1057

77.9%

77.9%

Black

191

14.1%

92.0%

Other

109

8.0%

100.0%

Total

1357

100.0%

Respondent's Race Recoded
Frequency
White
All Races Excluding White
Total

%

Cumulative %

1057

77.9%

77.9%

300

22.1%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

75

Total Family Income (INCOME06)
Midpoint

Frequency

%

Cumulative %

< $1,000

$500

13

1.0%

1.0%

$1,000 - 2,999

$2,000

11

0.8%

1.8%

$3,000 - 3,999

$3,500

12

0.9%

2.7%

$4,000 - 4,999

$4,500

7

0.5%

3.2%

$5,000 - 5,999

$5,500

11

0.8%

4.0%

$6,000 - 6,999

$6,500

6

0.4%

4.4%

$7,000 - 7,999

$7,500

14

1.0%

5.5%

$8,000 - 9,999

$9,000

23

1.7%

7.1%

$10,000 - 12,499

$11,250

42

3.1%

10.2%

$12,500 - 14,999

$13,750

45

3.3%

13.6%

$15,000 - 17,499

$16,250

39

2.9%

16.4%

$17,500 - 19,999

$18,750

35

2.6%

19.0%

$20,000 - 22,499

$21,250

53

3.9%

22.9%

$22,500 - 24,999

$23,750

40

2.9%

25.9%

$25,000 - 29,999

$27,500

76

5.6%

31.5%

$30,000 - 34,999

$32,500

86

6.3%

37.8%

$35,000 - 39,999

$37,500

65

4.8%

42.6%

$40,000 - 49,999

$45,000

133

9.8%

52.4%

$50,000 - 59,999

$55,000

120

8.8%

61.2%

$60,000 - 74,999

$67,500

128

9.4%

70.7%

$75,000 - 89,999

$82,500

115

8.5%

79.1%

$90,000 - $109,999

$100,000

96

7.1%

86.2%

$110,000 - $129,999

$120,000

52

3.8%

90.1%

$130,000 - $149,999

$140,000

42

3.1%

93.1%

≥$150,000

$150,000

93

6.9%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total
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Total Family Income in Quintiles
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Q1

258

19.0%

19.0%

Q2

255

18.8%

37.8%

Q3

318

23.4%

61.2%

Q4

243

17.9%

79.1%

Q5

283

20.9%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Total Family Income In Collapsed Quintiles
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Low, Q1

258

19.0%

19.0%

Mid, Q2-Q3

816

60.1%

79.1%

High, Q5

283

20.9%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Social Class (CLASS/CLASS1)
Frequency
Lower

%

Cumulative %

51

3.8%

3.8%

Working

491

36.2%

40.1%

Lower Middle

186

13.7%

53.8%

Middle

518

38.2%

92.2%

Upper Middle

95

7.0%

99.2%

Upper

11

0.8%

100.0%

1352

100.0%

Total

Social Class Collapsed
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Working (Lower and Working)

542

39.9%

40.1%

Middle (Lower Middle and Middle)

704

51.9%

92.2%

Upper (Upper Middle and Middle)

106

7.8%

100.0%

1352

100.0%

Total
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Importance of Wealthy Family to Getting Ahead (OPWLTH)
Frequency
Essential

%

Cumulative %

70

5.2%

5.2%

Very Important

338

24.9%

30.1%

Fairly Important

446

32.9%

62.9%

Not Very Important

347

25.6%

88.5%

Not Important At All

156

11.5%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Importance of Educated Parents to Getting Ahead (OPPARED)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Essential

100

7.4

7.4%

Very Important

572

42.2%

49.5%

Fairly Important

506

37.3%

86.8%

Not Very Important

141

10.4%

97.2%

Not Important At All

38

2.8%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Importance of Knowing the Right People to Getting Ahead (OPKNOW)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Essential

141

10.4%

10.4%

Very Important

484

35.7%

46.1%

Fairly Important

576

42.4%

88.5%

Not Very Important

137

10.1%

98.6%

Not Important At All

19

1.4%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total
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Importance of Hard Word to Getting Ahead (OPHRDWRK)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Essential

614

45.2%

45.2%

Very Important

687

50.6%

95.9%

Fairly Important

50

3.7%

99.6%

Not Very Important

4

0.3%

99.9%

Not Important At All

2

0.1%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Importance of Ambition to Getting Ahead (OPAMBIT)
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

Essential

564

41.6

41.6

Very Important

683

50.3%

91.9%

Fairly Important

94

6.9%

98.8%

Not Very Important

14

1.0%

99.9%

Not Important At All

2

0.1%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total
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Get Ahead Composite Values
Frequency

%

Cumulative %

5

0

0.0%

0.0%

6

0

0.0%

0.0%

7

0

0.0%

0.0%

8

0

0.0%

0.0%

9

0

0.0%

0.0%

10

0

0.0%

0.0%

11

7

0.5%

0.5%

12

16

1.2%

1.7%

13

61

4.5%

6.2%

14

131

9.7%

15.8%

15

148

10.9%

26.8%

16

192

14.1%

40.9%

17

232

17.1%

58.0%

18

213

15.7%

73.7%

19

158

11.6%

85.3%

20

112

8.3%

93.6%

21

52

3.8%

97.4%

22

20

1.5%

98.9%

23

11

0.8%

99.7%

24

3

0.2%

99.9%

25

1

0.1%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total

Government Should Spend Less On the Poor
(Attitudes Towards Public Assistance)
Frequency
Strongly Agree

%

Cumulative %

54

4.0%

4.0%

Agree

194

14.3%

18.3%

Neither

226

16.7%

34.9%

Disagree

695

51.2%

86.1%

Strongly Disagree

188

13.9%

100.0%

1357

100.0%

Total
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Appendix C - Internal Review Board Certification Letter
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